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 Trial TacTics
Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2012), is a reminder of  how important a child’s testimony can be in a criminal 
prosecution. Trial judges generally have consid-
erable discretion in ruling on the competency of 
child witnesses, but Harris indicates that the Sixth 
Amendment compulsory process right and the due 
process right to present a defense can limit that dis-
cretion to some extent.
Nicole Harris was convicted of murdering her 
four-year-old son. She lost her direct appeal to an 
Illinois appellate court and sought federal habeas cor-
pus relief. A district judge denied her petition, but the 
Seventh Circuit reversed and held that Harris’s Sixth 
Amendment right to present a defense was violated 
by the state trial judge’s exclusion of the testimony 
of the defendant’s other son, who was five years old 
when his brother died and six at the time of trial. 
The court also held that defense trial counsel’s seri-
ous errors in the competency hearing that resulted in 
the son’s exclusion deprived Harris of the effective 
assistance of counsel, because counsel was not ready 
for the hearing, had not interviewed the son, and did 
not secure the presence of a witness who would have 
shown that the son’s recollections of what happened 
where consistent and credible. The discussion here is 
limited to the admissibility of the child’s testimony 
and does not address the scope of habeas corpus or 
the ineffective assistance part of the case.
The Facts
The 23-year-old Harris lived in a Chicago apart-
ment with her boyfriend, Sta-Von Dancy, and their 
two sons, five-year-old Diante and four-year-old 
Jaquari. One afternoon Harris and Dancy went to 
the laundromat across the street, left the boys alone 
for approximately 40 minutes, and told them not 
to leave the apartment. Harris returned to check 
on the boys while clothes were drying and found 
Diante in the hallway and Jaquari playing outside. 
She yelled at the children and ordered them to go to 
their bedroom, where Jaquari began crying. Harris 
returned to the laundromat and Dancy went back to 
the apartment and took a nap after speaking to the 
children in their bedroom.
Dancy awakened to find Jaquari lying on the bed-
room floor, unresponsive and blue in the face with 
an elastic band from a fitted sheet wrapped nearly 
10 times around his neck. After Dancy attempted 
unsuccessfully to resuscitate Jaquari, he lifted the 
child and ran outside, where he met Harris returning 
again from the laundromat. With Harris driving their 
car, Dancy continued CPR in in the back seat, and 
they called 911. An ambulance met them and took 
Jaquari to a hospital. They went back to the apart-
ment for Diante, and returned to the hospital to hear 
Jaquari pronounced dead.
Chicago police officers arrived and questioned Har-
ris and Dancy, who agreed to accompany officers to 
the police station for further questioning. Detectives 
interviewed the two separately before continuing 
their investigation at the apartment, where forensic 
technicians collected the elastic band and the bed sheet 
along with a telephone cord that they suspected might 
have been used to strangle Jaquari. The detectives, 
who learned from neighbors that Harris had struck 
her children with a belt that day, returned to the sta-
tion and confronted her with discrepancies between 
what she and the neighbors said. The detectives would 
later claim that after about 15 minutes of questioning, 
Harris started to cry and burst out with “I wrapped the 
phone cord around Jaquari’s neck and then I wrapped 
the elastic band from the bed sheet around his neck to 
make it look like an accident.” (Id. at 614.)
After the detectives read her Miranda rights, Har-
ris recanted her initial unwarned confession. She was 
kept overnight in a holding cell, took an inconclusive 
polygraph examination, and then confessed again and 
said that she strangled Jaquari with the elastic band. 
A prosecutor came to the station and obtained a vid-
eotape of Harris’s confession, in which she stated that 
she had struck Jaquari with a belt when she came home 
from the laundromat and wrapped the band around 
his neck to stop him from crying before returning to 
the laundromat. The second confession made no men-
tion of the phone cord, which an autopsy determined 
was not used to cause Jaquari’s death.
The Trial
At trial, it was agreed that Jaquari died from asphyx-
iation as a result of having the elastic band from a 
fitted bed sheet wound around his neck, and that 
Diante was in the top bunk of the bed he shared with 
his brother when Jaquari died. The prosecution relied 
on the second confession and sought to prove that 
Harris became angry when Jaquari would not stop 
crying and strangled him with the elastic band. The 
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defense theory was that Jaquari accidentally asphyx-
iated himself while Harris was at the laundromat.
The state relied heavily on Harris’s videotaped 
confession as well as the testimony of the doctor 
who conducted the autopsy. The doctor originally 
concluded that the death was an accident, but 
changed his opinion after learning of Harris’s con-
fession and that traces of blood were found on the 
linen on Jaquari’s bed.
Harris testified on her own behalf. She admit-
ted scolding the children and sending them to their 
room, but denied striking them. She testified that 
when she came back from the laundromat the sec-
ond time she met Dancy outside holding Jaquari. 
Harris, who stated on the videotape that she had 
been treated well by police who made no promises 
or threats, also testified that she made the videotaped 
confession after 27 hours of coercive interrogation 
in which she was deprived of food and water, threat-
ened, and promised leniency if  she cooperated.
Dancy testified that he had previously seen 
Jaquari wrapping the sheet’s elastic band around 
his neck. Other family members testified that Jaquari 
was curious and playful, including an aunt who tes-
tified that she once saw the boy put a plastic laundry 
bag over his face.
Diante, who was six at the time of the trial, was the key 
witness for the defense but was not permitted to testify.
Diante’s interview
An investigator, Dr. Ale Levy with the Child Advo-
cacy Center, interviewed Diante the day after the 
death with a police detective present taking notes. 
The center partners with the Chicago Police Depart-
ment, the state’s attorney, and the Department of 
Child and Family Services. The officer’s notes indi-
cated that Diante contradicted Harris as to her claim 
not to have hit Jaquari and said that Harris spanked 
both boys when she found them outside the apart-
ment and caused Jaquari to bleed when she hit him 
with a belt on the leg. The notes also indicated, how-
ever, that Diante clearly described an accident in 
which “Jaquari was playing [and] wrapped elastic 
around neck from blue sheet,” and Diante was “play-
ing Spiderman game” and “couldn’t help Jaquari get 
out of his sheet.” (Id. at 616 (alteration in original).)
competency Hearing
The prosecution sought to exclude Diante as a 
witness. The trial judge conducted a competency 
hearing and began by misapplying Illinois law, which 
imposes the burden of showing incompetence on the 
party challenging a witness, and imposing the bur-
den on the defense to show Diante’s competence.
Defense counsel called Diante as a witness and 
had him spell his name, state his age, give his birth-
day, list the cities where he had lived, name his 
teacher, and describe the color of  certain objects. 
The trial judge asked him if  he knew the difference 
between a truth and a lie and Diante said, “Telling 
a lie, you might get in trouble. Telling the truth, you 
might get a star.” (Id. at 617.)
Diante said that on the day Jaquari died, Diante 
was with Jaquari and was “Playing my game.” He said, 
“Jaquari was playing with that string and wrapping 
it around his neck.” (Id.) He testified that the string 
was the band from the blue sheet and that only the 
two boys were in the room when Jaquari wrapped the 
sheet’s elastic around his neck. Diante answered “yes” 
when asked by the prosecutor if he remembered telling 
a Department of Child and Family Services investiga-
tor that he was asleep when Jaquari “got hurt.”
Defense counsel asked Diante whether he knew 
“the difference between real people and cartoons.” (Id.) 
Diante said he did and named “Scooby-Doo, Tom and 
Jerry” as examples of cartoons. The prosecutor picked 
up this line of questioning but, as the Seventh Circuit 
described the prosecutor’s questions, “the prosecutor 
shifted to use the word ‘real’ differently” and “[t]his 
shift caused some confusion”:
Q: Okay. Now, you were talking about some 
cartoons a couple of minutes ago. You were 
talking about Scooby-Doo, and cartoons and 
real things, right?
A: (Nodding.)
Q: Do you think Spiderman is real?
A: Yes.
Q: And have you ever seen Spiderman in 
person?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. And what did you say to Spiderman 
when you saw him in person?
A: Nothing.
Q: You didn’t say anything to him?
A: (Nodding.)
Q: Have you ever seen Scooby-Doo?
A: No.
Q: Okay. Is Scooby-Doo real?
A: No.
Q: Okay. Scooby-Doo is what?
A: A movie.
Q: Okay. And how about The Hulk? Is The 
Hulk real or is he something else?
A: Something else.
. . . .
Q: Okay. Let’s see. How about Santa Claus, is 
Santa Claus real?
A: Yes.
Q: And have you ever seen Santa Claus in 
person?
A: No.
(Id.)
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The prosecutor also had Diante say that he 
believed the tooth fairy was real. The Seventh Cir-
cuit concluded that Diante thought the prosecutor 
was asking whether Spiderman and Santa Claus 
were animated or human characters, not cartoons. If  
so, his answers were true and were in part explicable 
by Dancy’s trial testimony that Diante was familiar 
with Spiderman live-action films. The prosecutor 
also asked Diante about Jaquari:
Q: You told me earlier that you have seen 
Jaquari in heaven, right?
A: Yes.
Q: And do you remember the last time you 
saw Jaquari in heaven?
. . . .
A: Where I was in the rainbow.
Q: When you were in the what?
A: In the rainbow.
Q: “In the rainbow”? You were in the rainbow?
A: Uhn-uhn. No, in the car.
Q: Oh, in the car. And you saw Jaquari in 
heaven then?
A: (Nodding.)
(Id. at 618.)
The Seventh Circuit, relying on the conclusions of 
Dr. Robert Galatzer-Levy, a child psychiatrist who 
conducted a competency assessment of Diante six 
months after the trial, found that Diante was say-
ing “limo” rather than “rainbow.” The court also 
observed that during Galatzer-Levy’s assessment, 
Diante described a church as a “church with heaven” 
and a courtroom as a “church with the judge.” (Id.) 
The Seventh Circuit found that this was consistent 
with Diante’s testimony that other living family 
members were present “in heaven” in the following 
exchange that took on great importance for the judge:
Q: Who else was in heaven with him?
A: My brother and my cousin.
Q: Okay. What’s your brother’s name?
A: Junior.
Q: Okay. And he was there, too?
A: (Nodding.)
Q: And did you talk to Jaquari then?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: Did he say anything to you?
A: Yes.
Q: What did he say to you?
A: He .  .  . he said, my mommy killed my 
brother, and my mommy didn’t.
Q: Okay. Now, I want to ask you a little bit 
about your bedroom. . . .
(Id.)
The Seventh Circuit explained the importance of 
this testimony:
Because this account involves both of 
Diante’s brothers, we cannot be completely 
certain whether the “He” in the penulti-
mate line refers to Junior or to Jaquari. The 
difference bears on both the competency 
determination and Harris’s guilt or innocence. 
If  the speaker was Junior, Diante was describ-
ing what his surviving brother Junior had told 
him at the wake or funeral: Junior said that 
Harris had killed Jaquari, and Diante was 
telling the judge that was wrong. The testi-
mony is entirely different if  Diante meant that 
Jaquari appeared to his brothers from beyond 
the grave to accuse their mother of  killing 
him. The first reading is supported by the fact 
that Diante said, “He said, my mommy killed 
my brother,” not “He said, my mommy killed 
me,” or “He said, my mommy killed him.” 
The best support for the second reading is 
that Jaquari was the brother the prosecutor 
had last mentioned (three questions earlier), 
but it’s safe to say that six-year-old Diante 
was not precise with pronouns and anteced-
ents. Given the ambiguity, one would have 
expected counsel or the court to ask some 
follow-up questions to learn what Diante 
meant, at least before assuming that he was 
reporting a visit from beyond the grave. But 
nothing more was said on the subject. And 
not only did the court assume that this tes-
timony referred to a communication with 
Jaquari’s spirit, but it relied heavily on his 
report of  this supposed “fantasy” to find that 
Diante was not competent to testify.
(Id. at 618–19.)
Defense counsel wanted to call Dr. Ale Levy and 
informed the judge that he had subpoenaed her. The 
doctor was not present, and ultimately defense coun-
sel chose not to fight for a continuance to have her 
testify (the witness, according to the Seventh Circuit, 
who would have shown that Diante’s recollections of 
what happened were consistent and credible). The 
prosecution called a second Child Advocacy Center 
investigator, Karen Wilson, who interviewed Diante 
the day after Levy interviewed him, to testify that 
Diante stated that Scooby-Doo, Spiderman, and 
Santa Claus were real persons.
The trial judge ruled that Diante was incompe-
tent. The judge observed that Illinois provides only 
two grounds for disqualification as incompetent: 
inability to express oneself  so as to be understood, 
or inability to understand the duty to tell the truth. 
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The judge said that he was unpersuaded that Diante 
understood the duty to tell the truth. The judge also 
expressed doubts as to whether Diante was able to 
distinguish reality from fantasy. The judge therefore 
disqualified him on both grounds. In postconviction 
proceedings, the trial judge conceded error in placing 
the burden of showing competency on the defense 
but held that the same result would have obtained 
had the state borne the burden.
Direct appeal and the seventh circuit
The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the conviction. 
It found no abuse of discretion in the ruling finding 
Diante incompetent. Amazingly, it also held that 
even if  the trial judge abused discretion, any error 
was harmless because Diante’s testimony would 
not have influenced the verdict. The court failed to 
address Harris’s Sixth Amendment compulsory pro-
cess argument.
The Seventh Circuit described both the Sixth 
Amendment right of a defendant “to have compul-
sory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor” and 
the Fourteenth Amendment due process right to 
present a meaningful and complete criminal defense. 
(Id. at 626.) It summed up the law as establishing 
that exclusion of defense evidence abridges a defen-
dant’s constitutional rights where the restriction is 
arbitrary or disproportionate to the interests it is 
designed to serve and the evidence implicates a suf-
ficiently weighty interest of the accused.
The Seventh Circuit found that Diante’s testi-
mony was critical, material, noncumulative, and 
uncontradicted. It rejected the state appellate court’s 
analysis that Diante’s testimony lacked significant 
probative force because he said he was asleep when 
Jaquari died. It also rejected the argument that Har-
ris’s videotaped confession meant that the evidence 
for the state was overwhelming and observed that 
the jury had reasons to question the reliability of the 
confession, including the fact that her initial con-
fession was inconsistent with the physical evidence.
The Seventh Circuit summarized Diante’s prof-
fered testimony as follows:
Diante was by no means a perfect witness. He 
said that he believed Santa Claus and Spider-
man were real and that he had seen Jaquari “in 
heaven.” He also told [Child Advocacy Cen-
ter] investigators Levy and Wilson that he had 
been asleep when Jaquari got hurt, which was 
superficially inconsistent with the defense’s 
claim that Diante witnessed Jaquari’s death. 
(Nobody asked him to explain the difference.) 
And he did not respond to the court’s satisfac-
tion to two of its questions: first, whether he 
could “remember anything else that happened 
that day” (he said no); and second, whether 
he had “spoken before with any of the people 
who are here today before you came to court.” 
(Diante again said no, even though he had pre-
viously spoken to the prosecutor).
But none of these responses were explored by the 
court or counsel with even minimal follow-up. 
Had there been any, the court should have gained 
the same insights that Dr. Galatzer-Levy did: 
that Diante believed Santa and Spiderman were 
real to the extent they were not cartoons; that by 
“heaven,” [Diante] probably meant “church”; 
that he did not realize that he witnessed Jaquari 
die because he did not understand death; and 
that he remembered many details from the day 
of Jaquari’s death. Moreover, even if like many 
six-year-olds Diante believed that these mythi-
cal characters were real, such imaginings were 
not commingled with his memory of the day of 
Jaquari’s death and would not have hindered his 
ability to tell what he saw.
(Id. at 636–37.)
The court found that the larger problem was with 
the trial judge’s expectations of a child witness:
The bigger issue, and the trial court’s more glar-
ing failure at the competency hearing, was its 
unrealistic expectations for a six-year-old wit-
ness. As Illinois courts have emphasized, “[i]t 
is not incumbent upon a child to give perfect 
answers to questions asked during the compe-
tency determination or at trial to be deemed a 
competent witness.” A child’s belief  in Santa 
Claus or Spiderman does not make the child’s 
testimony about his real-life experiences unre-
liable. Nor does Diante’s negative response to 
the court’s general inquiry if  he remembered 
anything else from the day. Such a broad, 
open-ended question in a hearing or deposi-
tion often confuses adults who have already 
been testifying about what they remember. It 
was unlikely to elicit a detailed, substantive 
account of the day’s events from a six-year-
old, especially when posed by a stranger in 
a black robe. Likewise, the trial court’s ques-
tion, “Have you spoken before with any of the 
people who are here today before you came to 
court?” was both compound and ambiguous 
enough that many adults might have trouble 
answering it. Was the judge asking whether 
Diante had ever spoken before with anyone 
present at court that day? Or whether he had 
spoken that day with anyone present before 
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coming to court? And how many people were 
in the courtroom? The answer says nothing 
probative about Diante’s reliability as a wit-
ness. There was no follow-up to make sure he 
even understood the question.
(Id. at 637–38 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).)
The court added a footnote pointing out substan-
tial authority supporting its observation that “[a] 
child’s belief  in Santa Claus or Spiderman does not 
make the child’s testimony about his real-life expe-
riences unreliable.” (Id. at 637.)
The bottom line for the court was this:
If the Compulsory Process Clause is to be more 
than a “dead letter,” it demands that courts rec-
ognize that the exclusion of defense evidence 
can have constitutional consequences beyond 
the rules of evidence. Here, state courts over-
looked the Sixth Amendment significance of 
Diante’s testimony. By disqualifying Diante from 
taking the stand, the trial court deprived Harris 
of evidence that was favorable and material to 
her defense, and on the evidence before it, the 
exclusion was “arbitrary or disproportionate” 
to the interests served by the competency rule. 
The exclusion violated Harris’s right to present 
a complete defense under the Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
(Id. at 639 (citation omitted).)
lessons
Children do not have to be perfect witnesses to be 
competent to testify in a criminal trial.
When a child is a critical witness in a criminal 
prosecution, it is vitally important that the ques-
tions presented to the child be clear and that the 
child understand the questions.
When a child is the only witness to an event, it 
is especially important that the child’s testimony be 
heard and that the trier of fact decide whether the 
child’s testimony is reliable.
The fact that a defendant has confessed does not 
automatically mean that the confession is reliable or 
more important than other evidence that casts doubt 
on the reliability of the confession. n
